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Abstract
This paper compares the performance-matched discretionary accrual model (quantitative)
and the Mulford and Comiskey (2002) qualitative measure to compute earnings
management in two state-owned and two private entities for 1998 to 2009. The results
provide evidence that the two measures are unable to provide similar results for the
existence of earnings management. The difference in the results between the two methods
is attributed to the different ontological and epistemological views and the primary focus
of the respective models. The results do not imply superiority of any model.
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Introduction
Earnings management (EM) has been a major concern for most organisations for several
decades. One reason for this increased attention to EM is because it is conducted within
the bounds of regulation and moreover excessive EM could lead to fraudulent activities.
Second, and more importantly, measuring EM has been problematic. There are instances
of similar models indicating conflicting results (Hribar & Nichols 2007) and there are
different models available to researchers, without any analysis to indicate why different
models give differing results.
The ontological and epistemological views guide the development of models to
detect instances of EM in business entities. The ontological view predominantly guides
the qualitative approach and the epistemological view guides the quantitative approach.
This paper compares two different approaches, one based on ontology and one based on
epistemology, to determine EM practice in two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
publicly listed companies. The quantitative model, Performance-matched discretionary
accrual (PMDA), primarily focuses on detecting accrual management, while the
qualitative measure (Mulford & Comiskey 2002), is a more comprehensive approach
which incorporates other forms of EM, such as classification shifting and real activity
management. The results suggest that the measurement of EM across both the models is
not consistent.
A recent study (Naidu, Patel & Prasad 2009) provides results that indicate
differences in the outcome of the two EM models (Modified Jones Model (MJM) to
compute discretionary accruals (DAC) and Mulford and Comiskey (2002) model (MCM)
as a qualitative measure) for an electricity utility. This study uses the PMDA model
developed by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) as a quantitative measure and MCM as
a qualitative approach to compare EM in both SOEs and private entities. Kothari et al.
(2005) conclude that the PMDA model provides a more powerful test for EM. Hence two
SOEs, Fiji Electricity Authority (FEA) and Housing Authority (HA), and two private
entities, Flour Mills of Fiji Limited (FMF) and Communications Fiji Limited (CFL) are
used for the analysis. The small sample number is due to the comprehensive analysis
required as per the qualitative measure. The outcome of this research will be useful for
research considering EM measurement and for practitioners wanting to determine the
level of EM in industries for policy making.
The following section discusses the ontological and epistemological views of
acquiring knowledge and then presents a brief overview of EM incentives in SOEs and
private entities. This is followed by a discussion on the options available to conduct EM
as highlighted in the literature. The next section identifies the research method and then
the results are discussed. Finally, the paper concludes with limitations and areas of future
research.
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The Ontological and Epistemological Views on Earnings Management Models
EM modelling is a process that involves human inquiry into the level of its existence in
organisations. The study of knowledge such as research on the level of EM can be
described from two perspectives – the epistemological and ontological views.
Epistemology is described as “the nature of human knowledge and understanding
that can possibly be acquired through different types of inquiry and alternative methods
of investigation” (Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytinen 1995, p. 20). From an objectivistic
worldview, epistemology refers to the study of knowledge through observation and
experience. This view supports the qualitative approach to investigate the level of EM as
it relates to the observation of annual reports and accounting practice in the organisation.
The qualitative approach to detect EM is a comprehensive method that involves
investigating EM on a case-by-case basis. It incorporates the three means of conducting
EM: (1) classification shifting (Ronen & Sadan 1975a, 1975b; Barnea, Ronen & Sadan
1975, 1976; McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010); (2) accrual management (Jones 1991;
Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995; Kothari et al. (2005); Payne & Robb 2000); and (3)
real activity management (Xu, Taylor & Dugan 2007; Bartov 1993; Dechow & Sloan
1991; Bushee 1998; Herrmann, Inoue & Thomas 2003; Roychowdhury 2006). Hence the
qualitative approach involves various types of analysis and incorporates alternative
analysis of financial data. On the other hand, the quantitative approach is based on an
ontological view.
Wand and Weber (1993, p. 220) explain ontology as “a branch of philosophy
concerned with articulating the nature and structure of the world”. An ontological view is
a constructivistic worldview. From a constructivistic worldview, knowledge is contextspecific and varies between groups of individuals. That is, ontological constructions are
not absolutely true (Schwandt 1994). Reality is socially constructed and not discovered.
Social and cultural artifacts are involved in the construction process.
The quantitative approach to detect EM is based on the construction process and
is context specific similar to the ontological views. The quantitative approach has its
major focus on accrual management that has been the heart of EM study (Xu et al. 2007).
Accrual management models are constructed based on the non-discretionary accounting
elements available within accounting standards. The models are context specific
(McNichols & Wilson 1988; Marquardt & Wiedman 2004) and their results can vary
between industries and countries depending on available regulations. Also, different
individuals are expected to have different results as available regulation is broad. Hence,
the results may not be absolutely true. Despite several issues relating to the quantitative
model, it has been popular (Kothari et al. 2005), may be used in different contexts and
has undergone continuous development (Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991;
Dechow & Sloan 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kang & Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Guay et al.
1996; Hribar & Collins 2002; Kothari et al. 2005).
Recently, Kothari et al. (2005, p. 34) indicate that the Jones and MJM are “the
most popular choices for estimating discretionary accruals even though previous research
shows that (they) are severely misspecified when applied to stratified-random samples of
firms”. Kothari et al. (2005, p. 35) present the limitations inherent in the two popular
models and provide evidence that the “performance-matched discretionary accrual model
is useful in mitigating type I errors”.
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Thus, this study attempts to compare the two broad EM models to determine the
degree of consistency in determining EM in organisations by comparing the PMDA
model and the MCM.
Earnings Management Incentives
Dechow and Skinner (2000) identify two major incentives for EM. Firstly, in their view,
practitioners and regulators are usually more concerned about capital market incentives
for EM. Capital markets provide incentives for EM as they provide a market for trading
shares. Shareholders and potential investors react to new financial information disclosed,
which causes changes in the demand and supply of the corporations’ shares. Thus, this
impacts the share price. Managers, if interested in the share price, could manage earnings
to cause a temporary change in prices. However, in an efficient capital market, as true
information is available, the prices will adjust to their true values but the managers would
gain from the temporary price change.
Second, contractual arrangements also provide incentives for EM. For example,
bonus plans and debt covenants are based on accounting numbers such as profits.
Therefore, managers could manipulate profits so that they are able to maximise the
benefits from the contracts, such as a good bonus. Furthermore, Healy and Wahlen
(1999) also indicate that regulatory incentives provide strong grounds for EM practice.
Earnings Management Incentives in SOEs and Private Entities
SOEs are formed for the purpose of providing services to the public instead of
profit maximisation. In order to provide a reasonable quality service, the SOEs need to
have sufficient funds and it is important to have reasonable charges for their services to
ensure that a break-even position is maintained. Most SOEs in emerging economies are
dependent on government support in terms of subsidies. This gives an incentive for the
management to engage in income-decreasing EM, so that they can show losses in the
reports to justify the subsidies. Jones (1991) provides evidence that firms defer income in
the year of application of relief from the government.
The purpose of private enterprises is to maximise business profit and shareholder
wealth. Hence, unlike SOEs, private enterprises are expected to continuously increase
profits and would thus have benchmarks. Managers could be questioned if these
benchmarks are not met. Hence, management in private enterprises is expected to engage
in income-increasing EM when the business performance is below the benchmark.
According to Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) most managers find that it is vital
to avoid losses. Moreover, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Burgstahler (1997) and
Degeorge et al. (1999) explain that small reported losses are unusually rare than small
reported profits and small increases in reported earnings are unusually common than
small declines in those earnings.
Similar to capital market incentives, contract arrangements also induce EM. This
is mostly when certain outcomes in the contract depend on accounting numbers. A
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management compensation contract is a good example where bonus plans depend on
earnings or share price increments. This is common for both SOEs and private
enterprises. Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) explain that
managers engage in income-increasing EM to improve reported earnings when actual
earnings do not qualify for bonuses. Additionally, managers would defer accruals to
future periods when reported earnings have reached the upper limit of the executive
bonus package. Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) present similar work, however they
support an income-smoothing hypothesis. Moreover, Guidry (1999) supports Healy’s
(1985) bonus hypothesis and the study shows that managers manipulate accruals to
maximise short-term bonuses.
Both, private enterprises and SOEs engage in externally-sourced finance. In their
lending contracts with firms, lenders usually have a debt covenant to restrict the firm to
maintain certain accounting ratios or to impose limits to investing and financing
activities. Violating this covenant could lead to serious consequences for the firm,
including increases in interest rates, requiring additional security for the loan, or in
extreme cases the immediate payment of the loan. In order to avoid such consequences,
managers could be motivated to manage earnings (Beneish 2001). Prior research has
found some evidence of EM being motivated by lending contracts (DeFond & Jiambalvo
1994; Sweeney 1994).
Since a firm’s share price is to some extent dependent on the firm’s earnings,
managers are expected to engage in EM prior to equity offers such as Initial Public Offers
(IPO) or Seasoned Equity Offers. Higher earnings and increases in earnings signal
positive information that leads to an overvaluation of the initial offer price. Healy and
Wahlen (1999, p. 374) explain that some managers use income-increasing accruals to
“inflate reported earning in an attempt to increase investor’s expectations of future
performance and increase the offer price”. Singh (2007) also has a similar view and states
that due to information asymmetry between investors and IPO issuers, the IPO process is
susceptible to EM. Earlier studies have provided some evidence on this incentive. Teoh,
Welch and Wong (1998b) provide evidence on the relationship between EM and
underperformance of IPOs in the subsequent periods. Issuers with unusually high
accruals prior to the IPO year experience a decline in stock prices in subsequent years
reflecting the true financial performance and allowing the capital market to adjust the
share price. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) and Rangan (1998) provide similar evidence
around seasoned equity offering. However, this incentive is less common in inefficient
markets.
The Quantitative Model
The two approaches to detect instances of EM employed in this study are the PMDA
model (quantitative measure) and the MCM (qualitative measure). Although the MJM
has been identified as a powerful tool for measuring EM (Dechow et al. 1995), it is
severely misspecified. Performance adjustment enhances the reliability of inferences of
the traditional EM model (Kothari et al. 2005). Kothari et al. (2005, p. 35) “present
detailed simulation evidence on the properties of alternative measures of discretionary
accruals”, and state that “under most circumstances, performance-matched discretionary
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accruals are well specified and powerful”. Hence, we use PMDA as the quantitative
measure in this research.
The PMDA model includes a constant and a performance measure2 in the accruals
regression (Kothari et al. 2005) unlike the MJM. The PMDA model is as presented
below:

(1)

where:
TAit

= total accruals for firm i in year t,

Ait-1

= net total assets for firm i in year t-1,

∆REVit

= change in revenue for firm i from year t-1 to year t,

∆ARit

= change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t,

PPEit

= gross property plant and equipment for firm i in year t,

ROAit

= Return on Assets,

εit

= error term for firm i in year t.

The model is Total Accruals (TA) (
(NDAC)

component

equals the sum of the Non-discretionary accrual
)

(

(which

includes a constant and a performance measure) and the Discretionary component ( εit ).
Our focus when detecting EM is on the residual representing DAC that is used by
management to “cook the books”. The other components are equally important as they
are used to determine the magnitude and directions of the DAC or EM.

2

Kothari, Leone & Wasley (2005) provide an explanation for the inclusion of the performance measure and
the constant term in the accruals regression.
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Jones (1991) explains TA as the change in non-cash working capital less
depreciation expense. There are two approaches to compute TA, the income approach and
the balance sheet approach. Since the balance sheet approach has been widely used in
research,3 it is used in this paper to compute TA. Accordingly it is calculated as follows:
TA = ∆Current Assets – ∆Current Liabilities – ∆Cash + ∆Current Maturities of LongTerm Debt – Depreciation and Amortisation Expense
NDAC, a vital component, represents the accruals that cannot be manipulated by
the managers. The model identifies a number of NDAC components. First, the constant
term (α) provides control for heteroskedasticity and mitigates problems stemming from
an omitted size variable (Kothari et al. 2005). Next, the difference between changes in
revenues and accounts receivable cannot be manipulated. For example,

Account

2010 ($)

2011 ($)

Transaction during the year

Revenue

100

230

1. Cash Sales $40

Accounts Receivable

50

140

2. Credit Sales $70

Cash

40

80

3. Credit Sales $20

If we compute ∆REV – ∆AR, we will get:
= 130 – 90
= 40
This represents the cash sales that cannot be manipulated easily.
Gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) is the value of physical assets
recorded in the balance sheet. The cost or revaluation model could be used to record
PPE. The cost model was used until recently. Now, due to the introduction of fair value
accounting, some entities use the revaluation model. The cost model does not allow much
scope for manipulation as the original cost is recorded. Hence, it is considered a NDAC
component. However, the use of fair value accounting requires management’s judgments.
It may not be appropriate to use the current models for firms using the revaluation model
where PPE could be a discretionary component.

3

Kothari et al. (2005) and Cheng and Reitenga (2009) use the balance sheet approach to compute total
accruals.
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Return on Assets (ROA) is included in the model to control for firm performance.
Kothari et al. (2005, p. 2) explain that “performance and estimated discretionary accruals
exhibit a mechanical relation”. Lastly, the error term, which is the residual from TA after
considering NDAC, is the proxy for EM and DAC. Hence, this model is an indirect
measure. It does not identify items that are considered to be DAC. However, it identifies
NDAC and calculates the residual from TA.
The Qualitative Model
The qualitative method, unlike the quantitative models, provides a direct measure to
detect EM. It attempts to identify all of the discretionary components instead of
computing it as a residual. Mulford and Comiskey (2002) present checklists to detect
EM. The four checklists are: detecting premature or fictitious revenue; detecting
aggressive capitalisation and extended amortisation; detecting misreported assets and
liabilities; and using operating cash flows to detect EM. These checklists outline
questions to determine the instances of EM. The following paragraphs (adopted from
Naidu et al. 2009) briefly describe these checklists.4
The first checklist, which highlights recognising premature or fictitious revenue,
is divided into several sections. The first section requires individuals (people identifying
instances of EM) to understand the entity’s revenue recognition policy. Such
understanding could be gathered from carefully evaluating the notes section of the
Annual Report. Also imperative is reviewing the disclosure of related party transactions.
Thirdly, individuals are required to analyse the physical capacity of the firm to gauge its
potential to generate the reported revenue. Overstatement or understatement of accounts
receivable is also considered due to the double entry concept. This means that any
premature or fictitious revenue would be recorded against an asset account. Hence, other
asset accounts could also be used, such as prepaid expenses, which are considered in the
last section.
The second checklist is divided into two parts: detecting aggressive capitalisation
policies and detecting aggressive amortisation policies. The first part highlights four
useful analytical tools: (1) reviewing the entity’s capitalisation policy; (2) carefully
considering what the capitalised cost represents; (3) checking whether the entity has been
aggressive in its capitalisation policy in the past; and (4) checking for costs capitalised in
stealth. Other methods are also considered to be useful such as comparing the
capitalisation policies with the competitors and the industry. However, competitors could
also be employing aggressive capitalisation policies.
The second part of this checklist deals with detecting extended amortisation
policies. This is done by firstly computing the average amortisation period for a
company’s depreciable assets, and secondly, checking for extended amortisation periods
in prior years.
The third checklist detects any misreported assets and liabilities. This checklist is
also divided into two parts: detecting overvalued assets and detecting undervalued
liabilities. The former concentrates on assets like accounts receivable, inventory and
investments. Assets subject to annual depreciation are considered in the second checklist.
4

A detailed explanation is available in Mulford and Comiskey (2002).
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Although accounts receivable is examined in the first checklist, this (the third) checklist
considers the improper valuation of accounts receivable through adjusting entries.
Entities could manipulate provision for doubtful debts to misreport earnings.
Inventories can be manipulated by misreporting the physical count, misreporting
the dollar value without altering the quantity, or postponing transactions. The method
used to record inventories could also be considered. Internal control procedures are also
considered in this checklist. The checklist allows investigating investments with a major
focus on changes in fair value.
Checklist 3 is also used to gather information on understating liabilities like
accrued expenses and accounts payable. Trends in accrued expenses could be identified
and compared with the revenue growth rate. A time series comparison of administrative
expenses as a percentage of revenue could also be a useful test. Furthermore, accounts
payables increase due to the credit purchase of inventory. The growth rate of accounts
payable could be compared against inventory to figure any unusual change. Computing
the number of accounts payable days is another method to detect any understatement.
The last checklist uses cash flows from operations to detect EM practices.
Operating cash flows may not be exclusively helpful but they could be used in
conjunction with income from continuing operations adjusted for nonrecurring events.
This checklist requires computing the adjusted cash flow-to-income ratio. This will be
useful in identifying discernible trends over time. Any unusual change in trends would
mean that EM practices have been employed.
On a case-by-case basis, these checklists would identify any unexplained
behaviour or unusual trends. Analysis will involve explanations for any unusual
behaviour and any incentives driving this behaviour. Analysis will also depict whether
generally accepted accounting principles have been followed.
Limitations of MCM
MCM is a recent development and has not been extensively used in research; thus it lacks
practical guidance. The qualitative method is subjective to the interpretation of data based
on the researcher’s ability, whilst both the MJM and PMDA models objectively
determine the presence and directions of EM. The qualitative approach does not yield the
magnitude of EM. It only attempts to identify the existence of EM and possibly the
directions based on the researcher’s interpretations. However, it is difficult to identify the
extent of EM.
Overlap Between the Two Approaches
The logic behind the two measures is the same. Both methods identify the same
variables as discretionary components, thus implying that the same variables are used in
both measures to detect instances of EM. However, PMDA uses a quantitative approach
and MCM uses a qualitative approach. For instance, the variables that are used to
calculate TA are used in the checklists. Net income before extraordinary items and net
cash flows from operations are used in Checklist 4. Checklist 3 consists of variables such
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as accounts receivable and accounts payable, which are used in the balance sheet
approach to calculate TA. Depreciation expenses are used in Checklist 2
The independent variables in the PMDA model are revenue, receivables and
property, and plant and equipment. These are also used in the checklists. Revenue is used
to identify premature and fictitious revenue. Property, plant and equipment are used in
the checklists to determine the physical capacity of the entity to generate the reported
revenue. Receivables are used in detecting misreported assets.
Although the two measures employ the same variables, PMDA is an indirect
approach and MCM is a direct approach. The PMDA model is concerned about the
NDAC and computes DAC as a residual representing the instances of EM. The models
also differ because PMDA only uses financial figures while the other approach is more
exhaustive. MCM analyses the same variables with all of the other factors that affect the
variable. For instance, MCM analyses revenue values, revenue recognition policy, credit
policy, related party transactions and physical capacity to generate the reported revenue.
The other factors used apart from revenue values make the analysis more effective and
robust in detecting instances of EM. Thus, the results from computing EM using the two
measures may not be the same. This could be due to the comprehensive nature of MCM.
Moreover, the literature discusses three broad ways that management could
engage in EM. As discussed earlier, these are classification shifting, real activity
management and accrual management. On one hand, the PMDA primarily focuses on
accrual management, and thus as a quantitative model is unable to detect EM through
classification shifting and real activity management in most cases. On the other hand,
MCM is a qualitative comprehensive model that incorporates all forms of EM. The
differences between the two models can lead to different results in EM.
Research Design
Sample Selection
For the purpose of this research we have used two SOEs (FEA and HA) and two
private entities (FMF and CFL) to compare the results of MCM and the PMDA model.
We selected two entities from two different ownership types so that the results of each
could be compared. The purpose of this comparison is due to the different incentives for
EM in each of the ownership types.
It is difficult to obtain financial data for most entities due to the lack of mandatory
requirements on the publication of annual reports unless the entity is listed on the stock
exchange. Most entities were listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) after
2002; however FMF and CFL were listed in 1979 and 2001 respectively. The annual
reports for CFL are publicly available since 1998. Hence, FMF and CFL are selected.
FEA and HA are statutory organisations and their financial reports are publicly available
for all years. For FMF and CFL, we obtained data from 1998 to 2009. For consistency,
we used the same period data for FEA and HA.
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Research Method
As discussed earlier, this paper uses the PMDA model as the quantitative approach and
MCM as the qualitative approach to detect EM. First, suspicious events that indicate an
instance of EM are identified from the annual reports of each company. Then, EM
incentives within the firm are identified. Based on the event, and the identified incentives,
the direction of EM as per MCM is established. The PMDA model is later used to
compute DAC for the sample firms for the sample years. This result is then compared
with the MCM results.
While comparing the results, we consider the direction of EM, either incomeincreasing or income-decreasing for the respective years. This paper provides a year-byyear comparison of the directions of EM between the two measures. Direction of EM
using the DAC is determined by the quantitative calculation using the PMDA model, and
for MCM it is determined by examining the qualitative factors.
Results
Qualitative Results
Table 1 provides a summary of EM evidence in the SOEs. Panel A presents results for
FEA and Panel B the results for HA. It describes the incentives for EM and the approach
used to practice EM for the respective years considered. It considers approaches like
changes in depreciation rates, changes in provision for doubtful debts, provisions written
back, extraordinary items such as losses arising from write off, and classifications of
items like security expenditures. Similarly, Table 2 provides a summary of EM evidence
in the private entities. Panel A presents the results for FMF and Panel B the results for
CFL.
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Table 1
Summary of Earnings Management Evidence in State-owned Enterprises
Panel A (Fiji Electricity Authority – FEA)
Year
1998

Event
Increase in provision for doubtful debts and reversal of gain on disposal of assets

1999

Adopted high depreciation rates. Extraordinary item: losses arising from the write-off

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Abnormal item: costs related to civil unrest and security related expenditures. Postponed
significant revenue to next period with decrease in accruals
Revenue improved with increase in accounts receivables. Adopted high depreciation rates
Significant increase in provision for retirement benefit
Postponed significant revenue to the following period. There was high capacity to generate
revenue as its proportion to lag total assets was increasing
Adopted low depreciation rates
Adopted high depreciation rates and provision for doubtful debts
Provision for doubtful debts written back. Decline in provision for doubtful debts
Provision and VAT liability written back and costs written off. Grants amortised and classified
as other income

Incentive
To show difficulties and persuade for tax exempt status
To make a case to the government to extend the tax exempt status and reimburse the cost
of universal service obligations
To attract concessions and government grants
To attain duty concession and attractgGovernment grants
To attain government grants
To attain financial performance indicators within Statement of Corporate Intent
To attain duty concession of diesel fuel
To meet debt covenant. To meet Corporate Intent requirements (Return on Shareholders
Fund)

2008

Adopted high depreciation rates. Grants amortised and classified as other income

To meet debt covenant. To meet Corporate Intent requirements. To relay message that it
needs duty concessions

2009

Significant unrealised foreign exchange loss treated as ordinary income. The company still
made a good profit

To meet Corporate Intent requirements. To relay message that it needs duty concessions

Panel B (Housing Authority – HA)
1998

2000
2001
2002

Abnormal income item classified within operating income
Increase in provision for doubtful debts. Stock write-downs. Change in policy resulted in
decrease in interest income
Decrease in provision for doubtful debts. Abnormal items: government grants received
included part of operating income
Reversal of accruals and provision for repairs classified as operating income

2003

Decrease in provision for doubtful debts. Reversal of accruals

2004

Increase in revenue relative to capacity measured using lag total assets. Reversal of accruals

To beat budget projections targeted return on equity

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Increase in provision for doubtful debts
Significant increase in other current assets; significant decline in provision for doubtful debts
Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts. Increase in short term employee benefits
Decrease in revenue relative to capacity measured using lag total assets
Significant increase in accounts receivable and revenue relative to capacity

To achieve stretched profit budget projections
To provide return of 10% on Shareholders Fund
To attract government grants
To attract government grants
To attract government grants. This was subsequently provided

1999
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To beat budget projections and attract government grants
Converting debt into equity
To attain government guarantee on housing bonds
To attract government’s decision to favour debt to equity conversion
To attain the conversion of debt to equity
To provide improved performance upon restructure and the replacement of Chief
Executive Officer
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Table 2
Summary of Earnings Management Evidence in Private Entities
Panel A (Flour Mills of Fiji – FMF)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Adopted high depreciation rates
Increase in provision for doubtful debts
Large decline in debtors and other receivables while provision for doubtful debts was high
Large increase in debtors and other receivables while growth of operating capacity decreased
Adopted low depreciation rates

2003

Decline in provision for doubtful debts

2004
2005

Adopted high depreciation rates
Significant decline in provision for doubtful debts

2006

Further decline in provision for doubtful debts and change in amortisation policy

2007
2008
2009

Increase in provision for doubtful debts
Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts
Decline in provision for doubtful debts

Specific incentive could not be identified with limited information in annual report
To draw attention to the impact of significant reduction in import protection
Specific incentive could not be identified with limited information in annual report
Import protection was granted, hence positive results shown
A new Chief Financial Officer was appointed who could have incentive to show positive
results
To smooth earnings due to significant increase in revenue
To provide positive results to the market despite the introduction of a competitor
A new Chief Financial Officer was appointed who could have incentive to show positive
results
To draw attention to the impact of the Price and Income Board's decision against the
company
To avoid significant decline in operating profit

Panel B (Communications Fiji Limited – CFL)
1998

Significant increase in other receivables and decline in provision for doubtful debts

1999
2000
2001

Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts and increase in depreciation charge
Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts
Significant decline in other receivables and adopted low depreciation rates

2002

Significant decline in provision for repairs and maintenance and annual leave

2003

Increase in revenue while debtors and other receivables declined

2004
2005
2006

Significant increase in other receivables while revenue remained stagnant
Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts. Significant loss on impairment
Significant decline in provision for doubtful debts

2007

Adopted high depreciation rates

2008

Significant decline in provision for doubtful debts

To attract an application for an Initial Public Offer
To provide positive information to the market after being listed and to approach targeted
earnings in the Prospectus
To provide positive information to the market after being listed and to exceed targeted
earnings in the Prospectus
To maintain earnings growth. Specific incentives could not be identified
Specific incentives could not be identified. To smoothen the earnings trend over time
To avoid loss as income from operations was significantly reduced
To induce a temporary decline in share prices as an employee-share incentive plan was
introduced
To maximise compensation as per the employee-share incentive plan

2009

Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts

Specific incentives could not be identified. To smoothen the growth in earnings trend.
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Specific incentives could not be identified. Broadly to meet debt covenants
Specific incentives could not be identified. Probably for tax savings

Earnings Management Events in SOEs and Private Entities
Broadly, the approaches used for EM by SOEs and private entities differ. The selected
private entities have used only a few events to engage in EM, mostly the use of accruals
(accounts and other receivables), provision for doubtful debts and changes in depreciation
policies. On the other hand, the SOEs have used many ways to engage in EM. Including
the techniques used by private entities, SOEs have also used abnormal items, reversal of
gains from disposal of fixed assets, provision for retirement benefits, liability writebacks, stock write-down, unrealised foreign exchange loss and reversal of accruals.
The use of different events for SOEs can be mainly attributed to the differences in
the incentives to engage in EM for each ownership type. Also, SOEs and private entities
have different operating purposes. The former has the goal of providing service with the
minimum possible cost while the latter has the aim of maximising profits.
PMDA Results
Table 3 presents the results computed using the PMDA model as well as comparing the
MCM results for the respective years for SOEs. Panel A displays the DAC and its
comparison for FEA. Panel B provides the same for HA. The direction of EM is the same
in 7 instances out of 12 for both SOEs. The two models provide different results in
approximately 42% instances.
Table 3
Comparative Results for the PMDA model and MCM for State-owned Enterprises
Panel A (Fiji Electricity Authority – FEA)
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

DAC
-0.0182
-0.0031
-0.1853
-0.0127
-0.0631
-0.0130
-0.1205
-0.0476
-0.0145
-0.0095
-0.0356
0.0583

Directions as per MCM
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing / income – increasing
income – decreasing

Comparisons
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Different
Same
Different
Different
Different
Different

income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing

Same
Same
Same
Same
Different
Different
Different
Same
Different
Same
Same
Different

Panel B (Housing Authority – HA)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

8.6823
-8.9903
3.2524
6.4364
-3.6792
-1.3147
-0.5101
-1.6808
-0.7991
-1.3212
-1.1223
-0.3003
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Table 4 compares the results from the two models for the private entities, FMF in
Panel A and CFL in Panel B. The direction of EM is same in 6 instances for FMF and 10
instances for CFL out of a total of 12. On average the results are different in fewer
instances for private entities than SOEs. The following paragraphs discuss possible
foundations for the inconsistency in the results from the two approaches to measure EM.
Table 4
Comparative Results for the PMDA model and MCM for Private Entities
Panel A (Flour Mills of Fiji – FMF)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

-0.3291
-0.2087
0.0200
0.1081
-0.1171
-0.0098
-0.0474
0.0316
-0.2107
-0.3029
0.7214
-0.2866

income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing

Same
Same
Different
Same
Different
Different
Same
Same
Different
Same
Different
Different

income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing
income – increasing
income – decreasing

Same
Different
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Different
Same
Same
Same

Panel B (Communications Fiji Limited – CFL)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

0.0364
0.0145
-0.0602
0.1211
0.0020
0.0613
0.0115
-0.0121
-0.0193
-0.0130
0.0348
-0.0779

Foundations for Inconsistency between MCM and the PMDA model
The results of the two measures of EM differ due to the different perspective adopted in
developing each model, namely the ontological and epistemological views. The
epistemological explanation takes a broader view and incorporates alternative approaches
in acquiring knowledge. This is more aligned with the qualitative measure that
incorporates most ways in which one could engage in EM. The ontological perspective
involves a construction process similar to the empirical modelling of accrual
management. The knowledge acquired through this process may not be absolutely true.
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EM is achieved through various means including the use of accruals, changes in
accounting methods, and policies and changes in capital structure like debt defeasance or
debt-equity swaps (Jones 1991). Similarly Ronen and Sadan (1975a, 1975b) explain that
EM is conducted using approaches such as classification shifting, real activity
management and accrual management. While scrutinising EM using MCM, most of the
possibilities to conduct EM are considered. The checklists discussed in this study
demonstrate that MCM incorporates most of the techniques of committing EM. However,
the PMDA model detects instances of EM that are mainly committed through accrual
management. This is a major drawback of the quantitative measure and also a rationale
that leads to the differences in the results produced by the two models.
Table 5 provides a summary of the events that are captured by the quantitative
model. The following events are captured in the PMDA model: adoption of high tax
depreciation rates; changes in depreciation rates; provision for doubtful debts; provision
for retirement plans; provision for write-down of inventory; reversal of gain from
disposal of fixed assets; and the use of accruals. Since the quantitative model captures
these events, it can produce the same outcome as the qualitative measure for the years
that these events have been used to manage earnings. However, for other years the
outcome of the two models differs.
Table 5
Summary of Common Events and Similar Ability of the Two Approaches to Detect Earnings
Management Arising From the Respective Events
Event
Abnormal items
Adopted high depreciation rates
Adopted lower depreciation rates
Change in amortisation policy
Liability write-back
Provision for doubtful debts
Provision for retirement plan
Provision for write-down of inventory
Reversal of accruals
Reversal of gain from disposal of assets
The use of accruals
Unrealised foreign exchange loss

PMDA model and MCM have same result
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

The PMDA model tends to ignore other important factors that lead to EM. These
factors include changes in accounting policies such as revenue recognition policies, credit
policies, EM through classification shifting and the use of real business activities. For
example, FEA ceased to capitalise certain overheads to property, plant and equipment
and the revaluation of non-current assets. This is a major limitation of using the
quantitative models and further research is required to further develop the model.
However, this inconsistency does not imply that one model is superior to the other.
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Conclusion
We employ the PMDA model (quantitative) and MCM (qualitative) to compare EM in
two SOEs and two private entities. We find that the measurement of EM across both
models is not consistent. The differences are explained using the ontological and
epistemological views of acquiring knowledge. This is related to the three broad ways in
which management can engage in EM, which are are classification shifting, real activity
management and accrual management. While the PMDA model is specifically for accrual
management, the qualitative approach generally incorporates all three categories.
This paper also attempts to identify some limitations of each method discussed.
Even though the qualitative measure is a comprehensive approach, it does not compute
the magnitude of EM and is also very subjective. Moreover, one may not be able to
identify all instances of EM using either approach. In addition, it is time-consuming to
evaluate individual annual reports and more difficult in countries where disclosure is
inadequate and business management is hesitant in providing information.
On the other hand, the PMDA model objectively determines the presence of EM
and could be reliably used in empirical research. The accrual model has gone through a
number of revisions and Kothari et al. (2005) provide a powerful test. However, this
model does not incorporate the qualitative factors. It is developed to detect EM conducted
through accrual management, and in most cases it may not detect EM through
classification shifting and real activity management. Researchers have also discussed the
expectations model for real activity management. Hence, future research could
incorporate the ideas from each form of EM and further develop the quantitative measure.
The use of only four selected companies is a major limitation of this study. This
idea requires further exploration using more data so that the results could be validated.
The results identify the events being captured by the quantitative model and indicate that
more research is required to incorporate other events in the quantitative model. Mulford
and Comiskey (2002) provide a good guide for future research to enhance the ability of
the quantitative models to detect EM.
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